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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2005, the German legislature adopted a new law, entitled
"Luftsicherheitsgesetz" (LuftSiG), that authorizes the shooting down of
a civil airliner imminently intended to be used as a weapon of destruc-
tion against a ground target.' Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
* Ph.D., LL.M., New York University. The author currently works as a research asso-
ciate at the Bucerius Law School, Hamburg. Warm thanks are due to Nils Melzer and James
Stewart for their helpful comments and remarks.
1. Gesetz zur Neuregelung von Luftsicherheitsaufgaben (German Aerial Security
Law), v. 11.1.2005 (BGBI.I.S.78) [hereinafter LuftSiG].
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various states have contemplated similar scenarios; the consideration by
U.S. authorities of shooting down a single-engine sports plane that had
mistakenly entered Washington airspace adjacent to the White House in
May 2005 is only one of the most recent examples.2
It seems to have escaped close scrutiny, however, that a 1998
amendment to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation,
article 3bis, prohibits the use of weapons against civil aircraft.3 Germany
has ratified the amendment without reservation.4 While the U.S. has not,
its practices suggest that it nevertheless feels bound by the rules stipu-
lated in article 3bis. Indeed, at the time of drafting, the U.S. delegate
explicitly concurred with the prevailing opinion that article 3bis merely
declares pre-existing customary international law instead of creating new
rules.' Moreover, in 1994 the U.S. Department of Defense suspended a
variety of its assistance programs to Colombia and Peru because of the
concern that these countries were using U.S. intelligence information to
shoot down aircraft suspected of drug-trafficking. The United States
feared U.S. authorities might become complicit in unlawful behavior
under the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, the relevant provisions of
which are based on customary international law.6
2. For further details regarding the incident on May 11, 2005 see Intruding Pilots
released Without Charges (May 12, 2005), at http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/1 1/evacuation.
See also Christopher Bolkcom, Homeland Security: Defending U.S. Airspace, Congressional
Research Service 3 (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS-RS21394.pdf
(last visited 17 May 2005), according to which: "In dire situations, hijacked civil aircraft may
also need to be shot down, likely be preferred."
3. See Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, May 10, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 705-07(1984) [hereinafter article 3bis]. The
Protocol entered into force in May 1998 when 102 ratifications, i.e., by two thirds of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization's [hereinafter ICAO] member states, had been reached.
See also Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention], and its predecessor, the Convention Relating to the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (1922).
4. A list of the states parties to the convention is available at http://www.icao.int./
cgi/goto-m.pl?/icaonet/dcs/7300.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005). During the drafting process
Germany was among those delegations that stressed that priority should be accorded to the
safety of worldwide civil aviation and the concomitant prohibition of the use of force. The
German delegate emphasized that it "should be stated very clearly that, regardless of the im-
portance of the question of national sovereignty, the greatest concern must be shown for the
protection of human lives." ICAO Assembly 25th Session (Extraordinary), Executive Commit-
tee: Report, Minutes and Documents, ICAO Doc. 9438, A25-EX/4, 29 (1984).
5. ICAO Doc. 9438, supra note 4, at A25-Min. EX/5, 44. Furthermore, the U.S. had
introduced one of the elementary draft texts regarding article 3bis; See id. at A25-WP/3, 165.
6. U.S. authorities perceived a substantial risk that providing flight tracking informa-
tion or certain other forms of assistance to the aerial interdiction programs of foreign
governments that destroyed civil aircraft, or that had announced an intention to do so, would
constitute aiding and abetting conduct in violation of the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984. The
relevant legal memorandum referred to article 3bis of the Chicago Convention; despite the fact
that the United States had not ratified it, there was support for the view that the principle it
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Undoubtedly, the newly emerging security threat stemming from the
misuse of civil aircraft as weapons of destruction requires adaptation of
state policies.7 In light of the importance of the prohibition on the use of
weapons set forth in article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, and given
the gravity of potential repercussions ignorance of it may bring about, it
is quite striking that the increasing contemplation of forcible counter-
measures against civil aircraft has not considered internationally
accepted rules regarding civil aviation. The drafting process and the pre-
paratory works of the German LuftSiG, for example, are silent on the
matter and do not take into account the legislation's potential interna-
tional implications. This is surprising considering the imminent threat in
light of which the law was adopted is the threat of international terror-
ism, which means the majority of scenarios are most likely to occur in an
international context. Moreover, the relative proximity of Europe's major
airports, as well as the fact that aircraft in flight are legally regarded as
part of the territory of their state of registration, suggests a considerable
likelihood that a future target plane may not be a German airliner, thus
establishing an international nexus.8 Finally, as will be discussed below,
even the downing of a German airliner over German territorial airspace
may have international implications, as the prohibition to use weapons
against civil aircraft entailed in article 3bis of the Chicago Convention
extends to aircraft of a state's own registration.
It is thus the aim of this Article to map out the international legal
framework relevant for designing countermeasures against nonstate ac-
tors who convert civil aircraft into weapons of destruction. As a first
step, this Article sketches out the applicable rules relating to interna-
tional civil aviation security and highlights the dichotomy between
nonstate actor threats and interstate threats at the base of these rules. As
will be seen below, nonstate actors abusing civil aircraft as weapons of
destruction is a new challenge not only in terms of destructive quality
announces is declaratory of customary international law. The memorandum points out that
article 3bis should be understood to preclude states from shooting down civil aircraft sus-
pected of drug trafficking, and the only recognized exception to this rule is use of self-defense
from attack. See Walter Dellinger, United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down
Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, Memorandum for Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy At-
torney General (July 14, 1994), at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/shootdow.htm (last visited May
23, 2005).
7. See Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and Other
Terrorist Acts Involving Civil Aviation, Ass. Res. A33-1, compiled in Assembly Resolutions in
Force, at VII-I, ICAO Doc. 9790 (Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.icao.org/icao/
en/assembl/a33/resolutions-a33.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2005).
8. Aircraft in flight are legally regarded as part of the territory of the state of registra-
tion of the aircraft. Chicago Convention, supra, note 3, art. 17. Aircraft may not be validly
registered in more than one state, but their registration may be changed from one state to an-
other. Id. art. 18.
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but also in a legal sense, in that the question of the lawfulness of ade-
quate countermeasures is situated somewhere between the two skeins of
a traditionally divided framework. The Article then turns to a termino-
logical, historical, and teleological analysis of the first two sentences of
article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, analyzing this provision's inter-
relation with the right to self-defense and the contemporary debate
surrounding Article 51 of the UN Charter.
II. SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION-
THE DICHOTOMY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Different forms of misuse have accompanied commercial civil avia-
tion from the outset of its development. The Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation of 1944, in its preamble paragraph, empha-
sizes that "the future development of international civil aviation can
greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among
nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the
general security." The main concerns in this regard have been the threats
posed to civil aviation by nonstate actors on the one hand and interstate
incidents on the other. The international legal framework has been
shaped accordingly.
A. Threats Stemming from Nonstate Actors
The relatively short history of civil aviation indicates that this par-
ticular system of transport has always been vulnerable to different forms
of abuse by nonstate actors. It is thus hardly surprising that out of the
now thirteen UN conventions addressing the phenomenon of interna-
tional terrorism, four are dedicated to the relationship between terrorism
and civil aviation.9 The first reported incident of hijacking of a commer-
cial airliner took place as early as 1931, and many followed, especially
in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. '° The hijacking and subse-
quent destruction of three civil airliners in the wake of the Black
September Movement in the 1970s; the hijacking of an Air France
airliner in 1976 and the corresponding counteroperation, "Operation
9. ICAO, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, ICAO Doc.8920 (Dec. 16, 1970); Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-19 (1988), 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; see also ICAO, Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc. 8966 (Sept. 23, 1971) [hereinafter
Montreal Convention]; see generally Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection, U.N. Doc. S/22393 (Mar. 1, 1991).
10. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 653-55 (2003).
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Entebbe"; and the "Landshut" incident on October 13, 1977, after the so-
called "Deutscher Herbst" are only the most prominent examples among
many others. This dramatic increase in crimes of violence, which ad-
versely affected the safety of civil aviation during the late 1960s,
resulted in an Extraordinary Session of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Assembly in June of 1970. The session subse-
quently led to the adoption of annex 17 on March 22, 1974," which sets
out the basis for the ICAO civil aviation security program and seeks to
safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful inter-
ference.' 2
When the number of global hijackings of civil aircraft gradually de-
creased during the 1980s and 1990s, attention shifted toward acts of
sabotage, inflight attack, or airport facility attack.'3 From early on, the
evolution of different threats to aerial security was mirrored in the devel-
opment of the applicable legal framework. On September 14, 1963,
states parties adopted the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), regulating the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction. In 1970, states gathered at The Hague
signed the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (Hague Convention), 4 which in article 2 stipulates that each
contracting state undertakes to make the offense of unlawful seizure of
aircraft in flight punishable by severe penalties. One year later in
11. The annex is under constant review to ensure that its specifications are current and
effective. Because this document sets minimum standards for aviation security worldwide, it
receives further scrutiny before undergoing any changes, additions, or deletions. The Chicago
Convention designates international standards and recommended practices adopted by the
ICAO Council as annexes to the Convention. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, arts. 37, 54
(1), 90.
12. The aviation security specifications in annex 17 and the other annexes are amplified
by detailed guidance contained in the SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIA-
TION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE (1st ed. 1971). This restricted document
provides details of how states can comply with the various standards and recommended prac-
tices contained in annex 17. The Manual has further developed for the purpose of helping
states to promote safety and security in civil aviation. It aids in the development of the legal
framework, practices, procedures, and material, technical, and human resources needed to
prevent and, where necessary, respond to acts of unlawful interference.
13. These threats are still present. On August 24, 2004 suicide bombers in the Russian
Federation carried explosive devices onboard an aircraft, resulting in the total destruction of
two aircrafts and the deaths of all passengers and crew members. The ICAO Assembly re-
sponded by adopting Resolution A35- 1, which urged states to cooperate actively in holding to
account and punishing severely those responsible for aiding, supporting, and harboring those
who perpetrated the attacks, as well as those who sponsored them. Acts of Terrorism and De-
struction of Russian Civil Aircraft Resulting in the Deaths of 90 People-Passengers and
Crew members, A35-1, Oct. 8, 2004, available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/
a35/a35res-proven.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). See also U.N. Doc. S/2005/87 (Feb. 14,
2005).
14. See also S.C. Res. 286, U.N. Doc. S/RES/286 (Sept. 9, 1970) (calling on states to
take all possible legal steps to prevent further hijackings).
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Montreal, states signed the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), which
in article 3 again obliged every contracting state to make punishable by
severe penalties the offenses mentioned in its article 1: the destruction of
an aircraft in service (article l(b)); the placing of a device or substance
which is likely to destroy the aircraft or to cause damage to it (article
l(c)); and the destruction or damage of air navigation facilities (article
1(d)). Simultaneously, following the three-year cycle for annex amend-
ments, changes to annex 17 in 1988 included requirements of further
assistance in fighting sabotage against aircraft or facilities. In 1988, the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving Civil Aviation supplemented the Montreal Convention in an ef-
fort to more effectively deter such acts. Finally, in response to the
Lockerbie incident in 1988, states signed the Convention on the Marking
of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection in Montreal on March
1, 1991.
In essence, these legal measures focused on developing more appro-
priate measures and enhanced worldwide cooperation to prevent and
discourage the misuse of civil aviation by private actors. They targeted
these problems from either a preventive perspective or, assuming the vio-
lations have already occurred, from a criminal jurisdiction and law
enforcement perspective intended to attain an equal security standard
globally.
B. Interstate Incidents Compromising the Security of Civil Aviation
Apart from the diverse threats imposed by private actors, numerous
interstate incidents since World War II involving the shooting down of
civil aircraft in foreign territorial airspace have compromised the safety
of international civil aviation and international peace and security. Even
before World War II, the shooting down of a trespassing German balloon
by Russia in 1904 and overflights of French territory by German bal-
loons in 1908 instigated the 1910 Paris Conference on International Air
Navigation.'5 Prominent examples of post-World War II incidents include
the destruction of an El Al airliner by Bulgaria in 1955.6 Israel's down-
ing of a Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft in 1973, and the Soviet Union's
destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 902 in 1978 and Korean Airlines
15. Bernard E. Donahue, Attacks on Foreign Civil Aircraft Trespassing in National
Airspace, 30 A.F.L. REV. 49, 51 (1989); see also John Cobb Cooper, The International Air
Navigation Conference, Paris, 1910, 19 J. AIR. L. & COM. 127 (1952). With regard to similar
incidents during WWII, see JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 403-409
(1947).
16. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955, 1959 I.C.J. 127, 129 (May
26).
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Flight 007 in 1983 . These aircraft were often attacked not because the
state in whose territorial airspace they intruded feared an actual attack;
rather, they were approaching or overflying a militarily important area,
causing the state concerned to suspect espionage or surveillance of sensi-
tive installations.1
8
Aerial incidents of this kind often had far-ranging, disruptive impli-
cations for the peaceful relations between states. In direct response to the
downing of KAL 007, which left 269 people dead, the assembly of the
ICAO in its 25th extraordinary session at Montreal on May 10, 1984,
reaffirmed the Preamble of the Chicago Convention. It also noted that
while international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve
friendship and understanding among nations and peoples of the world,
its abuse can become a threat to general security. 9 Consequently, the
states at the Extraordinary Session set out to strike a more careful bal-
ance between the requirements of safety on the one hand and the
requirements of national air sovereignty and national security on the
other.20 In accordance with article 94(a) of the Chicago Convention,
states agreed to insert a new article 3bis stipulating the non-use of weap-
ons against civil aircraft in flight.2' On March 12, 1999, the Council of
17. Horace B. Robertson, The Status of Civil Aircraft in Armed Conflict, 27 ISR. Y.B.
HuM. RTS. 113, 115 (1997). With regard to incidents occurring outside territorial airspace, see
the Report of the ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation, The Shooting Down of Two U.S. Regis-
tered Private Civil Aircraft by Cuban Military Aircraft on 24 February 1996, Appendix B to
Council Document C-WP/10441, J 2, 3, 7 (June 20, 1996). The downing of an Iran Airbus
A300 by the USS Vincennes in the Persian/Arabian Gulf in 1988 would also fall in this latter
category. United States Report of the Formal Investigation into Circumstances Surrounding
the Downing of a Commercial Airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG 49) on July 3, 1988, Ap-
pendix E of ICAO Report of Investigation as Required in the Council Decision of July 14,
1988, ICAO Doc. C-WP/8708, at E-53 (July 11, 1988). See also generally William J. Hughes,
Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 595 (1980);
Bin Cheng, The Destruction of KAL Flight KEO07, in AR WORTHY, LIBER AMICORUM HON-
OURING PROF. DIEDERIKS VERSCHOOR, 47-74 (J.W.E. Storm van's Gravesande & A. van der
Veen Vonk eds., 1985).
18. More recently, in a statement by its Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao,
China reiterated its concern over the "serious threat to the national security of China" posed
by military surveillance flights. See http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zmgx/Military
%20Relationship/t35748.htm (last visited May 23, 2005).
19. Article 3bis, supra note 3, preamble T 2.
20. See ICAO, Report, Minutes, and Documents, supra note 4, at 24.
21. Given the gravity of such incidents, the ICAO has developed procedures for the
interception of civil aircraft, such as standard maneuvers to gain the attention of civil aircraft,
as well as standard radio and visual signals to be used in interceptions, and instructions for
coordination between military authorities and Air Traffic Service (ATS) units. See ICAO,
Manual concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 9433-AN/926 (2d ed. 1990). See
generally G. F. Fitzgerald, The Use of Force against Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL
Flight 007 Incident, 1984 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 291. Some delegations were of the opinion that
the Chicago Convention of 1944 was an adequate and balanced contractual document as it
stood and that it should not be changed. In their view, it would have been sufficient to amend
Fall 20051
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the ICAO reaffirmed the principles laid out in article 3bis(a), namely the
obligation to refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight, in relation to a civil aviation complaint involving the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The ICAO Council em-
phasized that use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight was
incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity.22
C. The Newly Emerged Threat
There is thus a regime of international conventions dealing with dif-
ferent forms of abuse of civil aircraft and related facilities by nonstate
actors on the one hand and article 3bis of the Chicago Convention,
which aims to regulate the use of force against civil airliners primarily in
an interstate context, on the other. For several reasons, the newly
emerged threat of attacks akin to those of September l Ilies somewhere
between the aforementioned legal frameworks. Firstly, law enforcement
as envisaged in the group of conventions relating to nonstate actor
threats neither deters suicide attackers nor provides a feasible response
in light of the potential destruction their attacks may cause. Secondly,
the interstate context of article 3bis differs significantly from the situa-
tion of nonstate actors who misuse civil aircraft as a means for attack.
States predominantly adopted article 3bis with the intention of confining
the "trigger-happiness" of states vis-A-vis aircraft that intrude into their
territorial airspace without authorization. The new threat, however, po-
tentially compromises a state's security interests and territorial
sovereignty far more severely than unauthorized intrusion or surveillance
activity by another state.
At present, only amendment 10 to annex 17, which was adopted by
the ICAO Council on December 7, 2001, and became applicable on July
1, 2002, has addressed this particular threat on the international level.23
Amendment 10, designed in response to the September 11 attacks, in-
cludes various definitions and new provisions relating to the applicability
of annex 17 to domestic operations; international cooperation on threat
the appropriate annexes to the Convention or develop a new annex. See ICAO, Report, Min-
utes and Documents, supra note 4, at 26.
22. See ICAO, Declaration Adopted by the Council of the ICAO at the Ninth meeting of
its 156th Session on March 10, 1999, ICAO Doc. PIO 03/99 (Mar. 10, 1999).
23. More recently, the threat stemming from Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
(MANPADS) has received considerable attention. See ICAO, Threat to Civil Aviation posed
by Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), Assemb. Res. A35-11 (2004). Recently,
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council has
recognized the threats posed by unauthorized proliferation and use of MANPADS, especially
to civil aviation, and accordingly established a catalog of principles. See OSCE, Principles for
Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, OSCE Doc. MC.DEC/8/04 (Dec. 7,
2004).
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information, national quality control, and aircraft access control; meas-
ures related to passengers, their cabin, and hold baggage; inflight
security personnel and protection of the cockpit; code-sharing/
collaborative arrangements; and response management with regard to
24 oacts of unlawful interference. All of these measures are of a preventa-
tive nature and do not adequately address the question of what to do, as a
last resort, if all other safeguards have failed and there is an imminent
threat that a civil airliner will crash into a ground target. Article 3bis
therefore remains the only provision that addresses the use of force
against civil aircraft in flight, and thus, despite its original interstate fo-
cus, it serves as the relevant yardstick in a nonstate actor attack scenario.
In Germany, officials briefly considered the threat of such civil air-
craft attacks as early as the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich. At the
time, Defense Minister Georg Leber hinted at the complicated legal mat-
ters surrounding an adequate response to civil aircraft attacks and the
necessity to solve such questions beforehand so as to provide for a
timely response. More recently, some have discussed the feasibility of
producing artificial smoke screens as a means to obscure potential
ground targets like atomic power plants.
In recognition that such safeguards could provide partial protection
at best, article 14(3) of the newly adopted German LuftSiG, termed the
"last resort clause" by German legislators, now authorizes the use of
armed force against an aircraft if circumstances allow no other conclu-
sion than that the aircraft will be used against people and that no other
means are available to counter the threat. The provision has sparked in-
tense domestic debate, but only regarding its consistency with German
constitutional law. 25 Given that members of the opposition party have
24. Simultaneously, on February 20, 2002, member states of the ICAO, in response to
the September 11, 2001 attacks, endorsed a global strategy for strengthening aviation security
worldwide at a two day Ministerial Conference held at ICAO Headquarters in Montreal. Press
Release, ICAO, High-Level Ministerial Conference Approves Worldwide Mandatory Aviation
Security Audit Programme (Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.icao.org/cgi/goto-m.pl?/icao/en/
searchicao.html (last visited May 25, 2005). A central element of the strategy is an ICAO
"Aviation Security Plan of Action," which includes regular, mandatory, systematic, and har-
monized audits to enable evaluation of aviation security in all 187 of its member states.
Among other elements, the Plan of Action included identification, analysis, and development
of an effective global response to new and emerging threats. Id.
25. See Manfred Baldus, Streitkrifteeinsatz zur Gefahrenabwehr im Luftraum sind
die neuen Luftsicherheitsgesetzlichen Befugnisse der Bundeswehr kompetenz und
grundgrechtswidrig?, 23 NVwZ 1278, 1278-85 (2004); Henriette Sattler, Terrorabwehr durch
die Streitkrifte nicht ohne Grundgesetziinderung-zur Vereinbarkeit des Einsatzes der
Streitkrdfte nach dem Lufisicherheitsgesetz mit dem Grundgesetz, 23 NVwZ 1286, 1286-91
(2004); Michael Pawlik, § 14 Abs. 3 des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes-ein Tabubruch?, 59 JUMIS-
TENZEITUNG 1045, 1045-55 (2004).
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announced they will bring the law before the Constitutional Court,26 an
avenue President Horst Kohler hinted at when signing the law and simul-
taneously expressing his severe doubts as to its lawfulness,27 it is not yet
certain how long the provision will remain in force.28 Nevertheless, the
terms of article 14(3) of the German LuftSiG describe a scenario numer-
ous states have contemplated and may thus serve as an example for their
future policies. Consequently, the lawfulness of forcible countermea-
sures merits closer scrutiny in light of international law, particularly
article 3bis of the Chicago Convention.
III. THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST HIGHJACKED CIVIL AIRCRAFT
INTENDED TO BE USED AS WEAPONS OF LARGE SCALE DESTRUCTION
A. Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention
The protocol relating to an amendment to article 3bis of the Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 1944, entered into
force in May 1998 when it received 102 ratifications (i.e., ratifications
by two-thirds of ICAO's member states). In the preamble of this proto-
col, states expressed their desire to reaffirm the principle of non-use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight and to amend the Chicago Con-
vention through a new article 3bis, according to which:
26. For the competency to address the federal constitutional court with regard to this
matter, see Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland(GG)(federal constitution), art.
93, 1, No. 2, in combination with Gesetz Ober das Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGG)
(Law on the Federal Constitutional Court), §§ 13(6)-(76).
27. Horst Kohler, German President, Statement (Jan. 12, 2005), at http://www.
bundespraesident.de/Joumalistenservice/Pressemitteilungen-, 11107.621599/Bundespraesident-Horst-
Koehler.htm? global.printview=2 (last visited May 23, 2005).
28. Apart from procedural questions concerning the competencies of enacting such a
law on the federal level while the area of law enforcement is a state right, the authorization of
the military to act domestically with the task of law enforcement is highly problematic in light
of the German constitutional framework. In addition, article 2 (2), which contains the fight to
life, and article 1 (1), which safeguards human dignity under all circumstances and without
exception, are at the center of the controversy. Moreover, military actions not directly related
to defense against military attacks are only admissible if they are explicitly provided for in the
Constitution. Provisions for the use of the Federal Armed Forces inside the state are found in
article 87, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as article 35, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Basic Law. All
of which, however, do not concern the threat stemming from civil aviation. To the contrary,
sovereign competencies of the Federal Armed Forces in the field of aviation only exist in rela-
tion to outside aggressors. See generally KNUT IPSEN, BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
GRUNDGESETZ, art. 87(a), 37 (1969); Karl Heinz B6ckstiegel, Competencies for Civil And
Military Aviation in German Law, in AIR WORTHY, LiBER AMICORUM HONOURING PROF.
DIEDERIKS VERSCHOOR, supra note 17, at 28. With regard to the domestic legal situation in the
United States, see the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
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a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on
board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
21
United Nations.
Many have debated the scope of article 3bis and criticized its some-
times ambiguous wording. ° Previously, in the absence of relevant cases,
these questions were mainly argued in the abstract. Now, with the use of
civil aircraft as weapons of potentially large-scale destruction and the
corresponding countermeasures developed by states, the need for clearer
answers has become more pressing. For example, according to the sec-
ond sentence of article 3bis(a), the shooting down of a civil airliner is
seemingly only permissible in cases of self-defense within the meaning
of Article 51 of the UN Charter. This in turn raises the question of
whether the scenario envisaged by article 14 of the LuftSiG, the em-
ployment of civil aircraft as weapons by nonstate actors, amounts to an
"armed attack" as required for the right to self-defense. Before embark-
ing on this discussion, different aspects of the first sentence of article
3bis(a) require consideration, particularly the issue of whether aircraft
intended for use as air-to-ground weapons can still be regarded as "civil
aircraft" within the meaning of the Chicago Convention.
1. The Scope of Article 3bis(a) of the Chicago Convention
Initially, an Austro-French proposal limited the scope of the obliga-
tion entailed in article 3bis to "aircraft of the other contracting States."
Ultimately, however, these words were not included in the final text of
article 3bis because the delegations wished to emphasize that the provi-
sion was declaratory of general customary international law and
therefore extended to non-contracting states.3 As a consequence, and
29. Similarly, the Montreal Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, specifies certain substan-
tive offenses against civil aircraft. It also states that "any person commits an offence if he
unlawfully and intentionally destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an air-
craft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight." Id.
art. 1(b).
30. See Cheng, supra note 17, at 59.
31. See ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 36, stating:
[It is such] a fundamental principle that it should apply to every civil aircraft irre-
spective of whether or not the State of Registry of an aircraft was a party to the
Chicago Convention. Under Article 36 paragraph I of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties it was possible to extend the rights provided under a treaty to third
States, and Australia believed that it was essential to do that in the context of the
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presumably unintentionally, the wording now extends the scope of article
3bis not only to all foreign aircraft but also to aircraft of a state's own
registration. Under this interpretation, states are now obliged to refrain
from the use of force against any civil aircraft in flight irrespective of the
aircraft's origin or location of registration.32 Some authors have claimed
that the very peculiarity of an international agreement establishing state
obligations vis-A-vis its own aircraft militates against such an interpreta-
tion.33 Whether this indeed constitutes an abnormality in international
law seems questionable, however, and such a reading is hardly untenable
in light of the wording of article 3bis, which explicitly includes any civil
aircraft. Consequently, as referred to above, article 14 of the LuftSiG
triggers international implications irrespective of whether the scenario it
envisages involves a German civil airliner or a civil aircraft of another
registration (the consequences of this result, especially the question of
legitimate countermeasures, will be subjected to closer scrutiny later in
this Article).
Two limiting criteria further reduce the rather broad scope of the ap-
plication of article 3bis. Firstly, the article applies only to civil aircraft,
and secondly, it requires these civil aircraft to be in flight. In light of
cases such as the "Landshut" incident at Mogadishu airport or the En-
tebbe operation, states added this latter qualification of "in flight" so as
to indicate that law enforcement actions on the ground, especially storm-
ing a hijacked aircraft before takeoff, remained permissible.
The article also entails no pronouncement with regard to a minimum
size of the aircraft. Article 29 lit. f) and g) of the Chicago Convention
evidences that the carrying of passengers or cargo is not necessary for an
aircraft to fall within the scope of the Convention and its article 3bis.
Nevertheless, one might argue that when states adopted the Chicago
Convention in 1944 they had not fully anticipated the subsequent devel-
opment of sporting aviation. In addition, article 44 of the Chicago
Convention, which lays out the aims and objectives of the ICAO in con-
formity with preamble paragraph 1, refers to international aviation and
international air transport, from which a certain minimum capacity of the
aircraft in question might be deduced. Of course, given that even the
smallest single-engine aircraft is capable of crossing territorial borders
and potentially impeding regular air traffic, and that an accurate classifi-
cation of small aircraft would be rather difficult, there seems to be little
non-use of force against civil aircraft to ensure consistency with general interna-
tional law.
32. Cheng, supra note 17, at 63.
33. Id.
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leeway to argue for a more restrictive scope of the Chicago Convention
that would exclude smaller aircraft.
With regard to the employment of civil aircraft as weapons against
ground targets, the question arises whether such aircraft can still be con-
sidered as civil aircraft within the scope of article 3bis(a). At the time of
drafting, some delegations considered the qualification "civil" unneces-
sary, given that article 3(a) makes the Chicago Convention applicable
only to civil aircraft and the word "aircraft" had been used in a number
of articles without further qualification. Article 3(a) of the Chicago
Convention divides aircraft into two categories, civil aircraft and state
aircraft, and the Convention goes on to define state aircraft in paragraph
b) in a purely functional manner as aircraft "used in military, customs
and police services." According to this functional test, which contains no
reference to ownership or control, an aircraft is a state aircraft whenever
it is functionally used in the services of the military, customs, or police,35
in which case it would fall outside the scope of article 3bis. Conse-
quently, article 3bis is applicable to all aircraft in flight regardless of
nationality, so long as they are not being used in military, customs, or
police services.
The use of the word "services" in article 3(b) of the Chicago Con-
vention instead of "purposes" implies that the drafters created article 3
predominantly with the intention to regulate state-to-state relations.
Police and military services, it would seem, are something only a state
provides, whereas military purposes could be pursued by any other actor.
Similarly, the events which led to the adoption of article 3bis were
largely interstate incidents in which civil aircraft had trespassed sover-
eign airspace, overflown military sensitive areas, and were suspected of
being engaged in espionage on behalf of their state of registration. Dur-
ing the negotiation of article 3bis, states considered nonstate actor
interference with civil aircraft to fall within the purview of other agree-
ments, namely The Hague and Tokyo Conventions, as well as
frameworks designed to regulate criminal law enforcement vis-A-vis civil
aircraft authority.
Nevertheless, during the drafting process of article 3bis, the delegate
of Peru drew attention to the problem that certain activities conducted
onboard a civil aircraft which could adversely affect a state's security
would not necessarily exclude such aircraft from the scope of protection
ensured by article 3bis. The delegate stipulated: "[T]here are aircraft
which were referred to as civil aircraft and identified as civil aircraft
which in certain countries carried out activities ... such as the spraying
34. See ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 8.
35. Cheng, supra note 17, at 64.
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of areas with bacteriological contaminants, the transport of drugs, con-
traband, gun running, the illegal transport of persons .... ""
In this context it is noteworthy that Jamaica proposed to qualify the
expression "civil aircraft" in article 3bis(a) with the words "engaged in
civil aviation," thereby a priori excluding aircraft used for purposes in-
compatible with the aims of the Chicago Convention.37 Similarly, Korea
emphasized that civil aircraft might be used for military or other aggres-
sive purposes and to that extent should be disqualified from the
description of a civil aircraft. Some parties argued that by introducing
the term "engaged in civil aviation," article 4 of the Chicago Convention
would remain as a fundamental feature of the Convention,38 aircraft not
precisely covered by the Convention would still be protected, and air-
craft employed for aggressive purposes could be excluded from the
protective umbrella of article 3bis.39
Ultimately, states rejected the Jamaican proposal and favored the
narrower concept entailed in article 3(a)40 because they feared the addi-
tional phrase "engaged in civil aviation" might open loopholes.4 With
the Jamaican proposal, states could argue all too easily that an aircraft
was being used for military purposes and therefore no longer qualified as
42a civil aircraft within the meaning of the Chicago Convention. In par
ticular, it was argued, such qualification would enable states to attack a
civil aircraft on the grounds, however slight or subjective, that the air-
craft was not used wholly for civil aviation purposes, a serious departure
from the international legal rules regulating the use of force in situations
of self-defense. Consequently, the interpretation would have had the ef-
fect of imperiling international civil aviation. 4 These concerns regarding
potential abuse are evidence of the prevailing perception, in the after-
36. See ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 52, 85, 102. The Peru-
vian delegate then posed the question: "what should government do in case where a civil
aircraft ... was involved in any one of the activities referred to, which he could only describe
as traffickers of death." Developing countries were also concerned that they did not have the
capacity to safeguard their sovereignty in the same manner as more powerful countries and
that consequently interception could sometimes only be enforced by the use of weapons
against such aircraft, namely ground-to-air weapons. Id. at 50. With regard to the practice of
Peru and Colombia of shooting down of civil aircraft used in drug trafficking, see Walter
Dellinger, Memo for the Deputy Attorney General, supra note 6.
37. Article 3 of the Chicago Convention entitled, "Civil and State Aircraft" provides:
a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to
State aircraft; b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be
state aircraft. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at 945.
38. ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 23.
39. Id. at 38.
40. Cheng, supra note 17, at 65.
41. ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 30.
42. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 37.
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math of the Korean airliner incident, of a dangerous "trigger-happiness"
amongst states to shoot down civil aircraft.
The dilemma of how to identify the precise purpose of a civil aircraft
in flight would likewise play out in the context of terrorist activity, as it
would be rather difficult to pinpoint an aircraft's non-civil use with any
degree of precision. If an aircraft's status is to be determined in light of
its purpose, the question remains as to which kind of criminal activity
qualifies as status-altering. A further question, with regard to the sce-
nario at issue, is whether an aircraft falls outside the scope of article 3bis
at the time of its hijacking or only when it subsequently becomes obvi-
ous the hijacked aircraft is intended for further illegal purposes.
Still, Robertson has argued that, viewing article 52(2) of Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions and article 3 of the Chicago Convention in
juxtaposition, it is apparent the "use" of an aircraft in a role making an
effective contribution to military action (article 52(2)) constitutes its use
in military service and thus removes it from the category of "civil air-
craft." 4 It is very much along the lines of such argumentation, however,
that the distinction between law enforcement and measures of war is
blurred in the proclaimed global war on terrorism, in which all presumed
terrorists are automatically described as combatants rather than crimi-
nals, thus waiving their immunity from direct military attack. In
addition, the contrary argument-that while the circumstances of a con-
flict situation permit a somewhat more restrictive definition of civil
aircraft, the legal regime applicable in peacetime does not-could be
deduced from the juxtaposition of the Chicago Convention and Addi-
tional Protocol I just as easily.
Such an argument seems more convincing in light of the drafting
history of article 3bis and its overriding telos to reaffirm the principle of
non-use of force. A systematic reading of articles 3 and 4 of the Chicago
Convention also backs this interpretation. While article 3 sets out the
44. Robertson, supra note 17, at 122. See also THE SAN REMO MANUAL, IT 62-63
(1994), at http:/lwww.icrc.orglihl.nsf/OF694fe2Ol6f347el cl25641fOO2d49ce?OpenDocument.
In recognition of the fact that civil aircraft can readily be converted to military use, the Manual
lists the following activities as converting civil aircraft to military purposes:
engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines, mine-
sweeping, laying or monitoring acoustic sensors, engaging in electronic
warfare or providing target information, acting as an auxiliary aircraft by, e.g.,
transporting troops or military cargo
* being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence-gathering system
* flying under the protection of accompanying enemy warships or military air-
craft
* being armed with air-to-air or surface weapons, or
* otherwise making an effective contribution to military action.
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criteria for distinguishing between civil and non-civil aircraft, article 4
addresses the use of civil aviation for purposes inconsistent with the
aims of the Convention without any reference whatsoever to an aircraft's
civil or non-civil status. Had the parties more leniently defined article
3bis so that all aircraft used for purposes incompatible with the aims of
the Chicago Convention fell outside its scope of protection, they would
have deprived the provision of its essence; it is precisely in such situa-
tions of doubt that states may be tempted to use force and in which
article 3bis obliges them to resort to other non-forcible means at their
disposal.45
Consequently, it is only in times of armed conflict, or more precisely
in cases in which there exists a nexus to an armed conflict, that the crite-
ria for determining the status of an aircraft are shifted towards a purpose-
oriented approach. 46 Even then, the San Remo Manual establishes a pre-
sumption in cases of doubt that an aircraft is not making an effective
contribution to military action and that it may only be attacked if it
clearly meets the definition of a military objective. In peacetime, how-
ever, a civil aircraft hijacked by a few individuals with the intention to
use it against a ground target remains a civil aircraft and thus within the
protective scope of article 3bis of the Chicago Convention.
2. Are the Obligations Imposed by Article 3bis(a) Absolute?
If it is accepted that a civil aircraft used in a manner envisaged by ar-
ticle 14 of the German LuftSiG is not deprived of its status as a civil
aircraft, the next question is whether the obligations imposed by article
3bis are absolute or whether the obligation to refrain from the use of
weapons and not endanger the lives of persons on board and the safety of
the aircraft admits exceptions. In this regard, the wording of article 3bis,
sentence 1 demands analysis, especially the use of the phrase "must re-
frain" and the implication that the obligation not to endanger the lives of
persons is limited to cases of interception. Secondly, the reference to the
rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations in the
second sentence of article 3bis also requires consideration.
45. ICAO, Reports, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 30.
46. For example, the U.S. Commander's Handbook provides that civil airliners in flight
are exempt from destruction unless at the time of the encounter they are being utilized by the
enemy for a military purpose or refuse to respond to the directions of the intercepting aircraft.
THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (Rev. A),
FMFM 1-10, at 8-4 (1989). The German Manual exempts civilian passenger aircraft from
attack. See DIETER FLECK et al., THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CON-
FLICTS 435, 1034 (1995) (exempting passenger ships from attack).
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3. Article 3bis Sentence 1
The phrase "must refrain" in article 3bis(a) entails a certain ambigu-
ity as to what exactly it requires from states. Some have pointed out that
the common understanding of the word "refrain" is less emphatic than,
for example, "abstain" and that refraining from an action often means
merely its voluntary non-performance.47 It is noteworthy that at the time
of the adoption of article 3bis, annex 2 to the Chicago Convention, in its
attachment A, paragraph 7, already provided: "intercepting aircraft
should refrain from the use of weapons in all cases of interception of
civil aircraft." By using the injunction, "must refrain," states did not sim-
ply follow the precedent of the annex but departed from the wording of
annex 2, according to which intercepting aircraft "should refrain" from
the use of weapons. Consequently, even though states did not agree upon
the stronger wording proposed in the Korean draft (according to which
states "must not use" weapons), 4 article 3bis does not allow the parties
the same discretion as annex 2 with regard to the use of weapons against
civil aircraft.
Still, given the wording in the second half of the first sentence of
article 3bis ("must not") and the wording, "must refrain," it could be ar-
gued there is a gradual difference between the two which implies that
while "lives and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered in case
of interception," the use of weapons should merely be avoided if possi-
ble.49 Such a reading, however, would contradict the very aim of article
3bis, namely preventing recourse to force against civil aircraft and ensur-
ing maximum protection of human lives.5 ° Given that states intended to
reiterate the general prohibition on the use of force entailed in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter vis-A-vis civil aircraft, the obligation that states
must refrain from the use of force is subject merely to the rights and ob-
ligations set forth in the Charter.
As drafted, the first sentence of article 3bis limits the obligation not
to endanger the lives of persons aboard civil aircraft to situations where
the aircraft is intercepted. Inasmuch as the use of force could exception-
ally be permissible subject to the conditions of the second sentence of
article 3bis, this obligation would be void. It is telling in this regard that
whereas the majority of previous drafts of article 3bis referred to the use
of force, states ultimately adopted the narrower wording of "use of
weapons." The understanding was that the legal forms of interception
47. Cheng, supra note 17, at 61 (referring to definition supplied by Webster's Interna-
tional Dictionary).
48. ICAO, Reports, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 182. The U.S. draft pro-
posed the phrase, "Each contracting State agrees not to use... I" ld. at 165.
49. Cheng, supra note 17, at 62.
50. ICAO Reports, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 29, 30, 46.
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foreseen by article 3bis(b) would ipso facto involve the use of some de-
gree of force against the aircraft without placing its passengers at risk.
Heeding genuine security concerns, and in light of the overriding aim to
ban uses of force which would endanger the life of the passengers, states
agreed that such a threat would most likely arise in the case of the em-
ployment of weapons.5' Despite the fact that paragraph 7.1 of the
attachment to annex 2 of the Chicago Convention already provided that
an aircraft interception should exclude the use of weapons, states felt an
essential need for an additional obligation ensuring forced landings of
foreign aircraft do not endanger the safety and lives of persons on board
and are carried out only at an airfield on which the aircraft can touch
down without danger. 2 This shows that the drafters had wider concerns
for the safety of civil aircraft and their passengers than merely those as-
sociated with the use of weapons.
4. Article 3bis Sentence 2
Thus, the obligation that, states must refrain from the use of force is
subject merely to the exceptions referred to in the second sentence of
article 3bis, according to which the "provision shall not be interpreted as
modifying in any way the rights and obligations of states set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations."
In this regard, discussion at the time of drafting centered first on the
question of whether any reference to the rights and obligations under the
UN Charter was useful, and if so, whether specific mention should be
made of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UN Charter, by virtue of its
Article 103, has precedence over any international treaty or agreement in
any case, and Article 51 provides for the inherent right of self-defense,
which preceded the Charter itself. 3 Reiterating the peremptory principle
of the non-use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter, the delegations to
the Assembly stressed that the question of the use of force was solely to
51. Even though it could be argued that in extreme cases certain maneuvers of intercep-
tion could also endanger the security of an aircraft's passengers, the Soviet delegate, the 25th
Assembly (Extraordinary) explained the preference for the expression "weapons":
[JInterception almost always involved the use of force ... Obviously, it was out of
humane consideration that force was used in interception to make an intruder leave
the country whose sovereignty had been violated without having to resort to other
measures which could pose a threat to human life .... Those delegates who called
for an absolute non-use of force had expressed that desire with a view to preventing
a threat to human life but that threat only arose with the use not of force but of
weapons.
Id. at 65.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 8.
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be answered within the Charter system.4 Moreover, states feared that
any explicit reference to Article 51 could be misunderstood as a license
to shoot.-" Therefore, the parties ultimately reached agreement on a gen-
eral reference to the rights and obligations of states set forth in the
Charter. Nevertheless, references were made throughout the Assembly
delegations to Articles 2(4) and Article 51. Although the parties ulti-
mately integrated neither provision into the text of sentence 2 verbatim,
the discussions indicate they saw self-defense in accordance with Article
51 as the only legitimate exception justifying the use of force against
civil aircraft.56
Yet some parties argued that absolute exclusion of the use of force
against civil aircraft was not justified, as the narrow scope of Article 51
would not always allow for adequate responses when civil aircraft vio-
lated another state's territorial integrity or independence. 57 Similarly, the
Soviet delegation argued that any reference to Article 51 substantially
reduced the capabilities of states to protect their sovereignty, removing
the right to stop the illegal use of civil aviation in any cases but aggres-
sion. 8 In the extreme, some delegations feared, ensuring complete
immunity of civil aircraft might even encourage violations. 9
The majority of delegations, however, agreed that modem interna-
tional law totally rejected the use of force for the sole purpose of self-
protection except in response to an armed attack, and then only to the ex-
tent and for the time required to eliminate the danger.60 This interpretation
finds support in the argument that if cases of interception are already lim-
ited to certain grounds laid out in article 3bis, measures involving the use
of force must be limited even further to the narrow concept of armed at-
tacks in Article 51 of the Charter. Accordingly, departure from the balance
between sovereignty and the non-use of force as foreseen in the Charter
54. Cheng, supra note 17, at 70.
55. ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 38.
56. See Draft Amendment on the Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO
Working Paper No. A25-WP/3 (1983). See also ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra
note 4, at 27, 30, 32, 36, 190.
57. ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 25.
58. Id. at 15.
59. The Polish delegate stated:
[I]ndeed, an aircraft registered as a civil aircraft, whether carrying passengers or
not, could be safely used for any illegal purpose including criminal or military pur-
poses, and would remain immune in a case where it was unwilling to correct the
violation and to land in compliance with proper instructions received.
Id. at 25.
60. The Belgian delegate spoke of a "Humanization in Air Relations." Id. at 46. See
also Steven B. Stokdyk, Comment, Airborne Drug Trafficking Deterrence: Can A Shootdown
Policy Fly?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1287, 1306-10 (1991).
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system (by virtue of its extending the right to resort to force to, e.g., the
guarantee of a state's security) would indeed have been a retrogressive
step.6' Consequently, a mere infringement of a state's sovereignty cannot
legitimize the use of force against civil aircraft unless such infringement
amounts to an armed attack.62
B. Self-Defense in Accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter
At first view, the use or intended use of a civil aircraft as a weapon
of large-scale destruction could amount to an armed attack, triggering
the right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.
There is little doubt that the abuse of civil aircraft as weapons against
ground targets, potentially killing thousands of victims and targeting a
country's focal points of economic, military, or political decisionmaking,
amounts to an armed attack as far as the issue of intensity is concerned.63
Far more controversial, however, is the question of whether attacks
by nonstate actors could amount to armed attacks within the purview of
Article 5 1. This issue lies at the heart of the current debate over how to
adequately respond to acts of terrorism, and it is determinative, for ex-
ample, for the issue of targeted killings of terrorist suspects living abroad
after having hijacked aircraft.
In the 1990s, attempts to broaden the scope of Article 51 largely
gave way to debates on the collective powers of states acting under the
auspices of the Security Council. Before September 11, counterterrorist
operations were almost exclusively treated as law enforcement issues. In
the aftermath of the attacks, the disturbing level of violence that nonstate
actors can inflict has caused significant uncertainty about the suitability
of including criminal acts related to terrorism within the purview of law
enforcement. This discussion has undergone quite a renaissance, and the
scope of Article 51, especially with regard to the behavior of nonstate
actors, is once again at the forefront of the discussion. 6 While it is ac-
cepted that Article 51 encompasses acts committed by nonstate actors
inasmuch as they are imputable to a state, concerns with the phenome-
non of international terrorism have led some authors to argue that
61. ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4, at 31.
62. Id. at 37.
63. Another critical issue is whether self-defense may already be resorted to before the
first attack has reached its aim (analysis of the issue, however, would exceed the scope of this
Article). See Humphrey M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States
in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS! ACADtMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 498
(1952); BRUNO SIMMA & ALFRED VERDROSS, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 288 (1976).
64. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
142 (2004).
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nonstate actor attacks constitute armed attacks in their own right, thus
triggering the right to self-defense.
With the shift from the state-to-state perspective toward threats im-
posed by nonstate actors, consensus on gradually lowering the threshold
for assigning blame to a state has grown. Acts committed by nonstate
actors are imputable to a state if the state has encouraged the acts, given
its direct support to them, planned or prepared them at least in part
within its territory, or if it was knowingly reluctant to impede them.65 In
light of this, some authors have agreed to the invocation of the right of
self-defense vis-A-vis the attacks of September 11 on the basis of the
connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban as the de facto rulers of
Afghanistan. 6  Still under discussion is the failed state scenario in which
a state is unable to respond to threats of potentially global reach that are
developing within its territory, as well as the issue of a government's
mere tolerance coupled with its unwillingness to target such activity in
its territory in an adequate manner.
67
With regard to genuine nonstate actor attacks, the situation remains
even more controversial. Arguably, this is the most probable scenario in
the near future, given that the determined will of the international com-
munity to combat terrorism imposes a high risk on states supporting or
even willingly hosting terrorists. The probability of exclusively nonstate
actor attacks might also be enhanced by the fact that what remains of al
Qaeda could be described as al Qaedism, a certain ideology random ter-
rorist groups adhere to inasmuch as it serves their purposes, rather than a
centralized and hierarchically structured organization operating from a
territorial base.
In its response to the events of September 11, the Security Council in
Resolution 1368 of September 12 did not confine itself to condemning the
threats to international peace and security posed by the terrorist attacks in
New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, but it also explicitly rec-
ognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter."8 In Resolution 1373 of September 28,
65. See BRUNO SIMMA et al., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMEN-
TARY 117 (1994).
66. RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 101 (2003); Davis Brown, Use of Force
Against Terrorism After September 11: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Re-
sponses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT.'L & COMp. L. 6 (2003); Christopher Greenwood, International
Law and the "War Against Terrorism," 78 INT'L Aim. 301, 314 (2002).
67. See, e.g., Frfddric Mgret, "War"?, Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13
EUR. J. INT'L L. 361, 383-84 (2002). See also Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also disrupting
Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12(5) EUR. J. INT'L L. 993,997 (2001).
68. S.C. Res. 1368, preamble 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). See gener-
ally Carsten Stahn, Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They
Say and What They Do Not Say, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L (2001). On September 12, 2001 NATO's
North Atlantic Council agreed that:
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2001, the Security Council once more reaffirmed the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense as recognized by the Charter in the
context of antiterrorism measures. 69 In this regard, it is also quite telling
that on October 5, 2001, the ICAO Assembly issued its Declaration on
Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and Other Terrorist
Acts Involving Civil Aviation. According to this declaration, "[S]uch
terrorist acts are not only contrary to elementary considerations of hu-
manity, but use of civil aircraft for an armed attack on civilized society
and are incompatible with international law.''7°
It has been argued that in neither of its resolutions did the Security
Council limit its application to terrorist attacks by state actors, a reading
supported by the lack of a limitation to state attacks within the text of
Article 51.7l Moreover, in light of the fact that the Security Council in
Resolution 1368 classified the actions taken against the United States on
September 11 as "a threat to international peace and security," thus open-
ing the way to adopt measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of
the Charter,72 it would be inconceivable if measures against the same ac-
tor would be impermissible under Article 51 in exercise of a state's
inherent right of self-defense.73
Such reasoning, however, potentially entails abuse inasmuch as it
interlinks the relatively broad and ever-expanding concept of a threat to
international peace and security in Article 39 of the Charter with the
much more restrictive prerequisites of Article 51. In addition, a certain
ambiguity remains in Resolution 1368; while generally recognizing the
right to self-defense, the resolution did not explicitly set the exercise of
[I]f it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the US, it shall
be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which
states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all.
Press Release, NATO, Statement by North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), at http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01 -124e.htm.
69. This should not distort the fact that the right to self-defense is "inherent" to the
victim and thus not dependent upon any authorization by the Security Council. Thomas
Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 849 (2001).
70. ICAO, Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and
Other Terrorist Acts Involving Civil Aviation, supra note 7, preamble 3.
71. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 6 (Declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (Jul. 9), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. See also Franck, supra note
69, at 840.
72. Such measures were adopted in S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,
2001).
73. Franck, supra note 69, at 840.
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this right in the particular context of the armed attacks of September 11.74
Nevertheless, in light of prevalent nonstate actor threats, genuine secu-
rity interests, and the wording of Article 51, there are indeed good
reasons to argue that the scope of the provision extends to nonstate actor
attacks. Even critics, however, accept that the limitation of Article 51 to
genuine state attacks "is to be regarded as a Statement of the law as it
now stands. 'T
The ICJ bolstered this position in an Advisory Opinion, Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, which recently confirmed that Article 51 recognizes an inher-
ent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one state against
another state7 6 and thus limited its scope to state attacks only. The court
further stated that Article 51 only becomes applicable if the respective
threat originates outside the defending state's territory.77 The question of
where an armed attack initially originated, of course, has a broader con-
notation than the question of from where a specific attack was ultimately
launched. The court also indicated that the situation contemplated by
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 fulfilled the "extraterritori-
ality" requirement." It follows that inasmuch as the criteria of
accountability are met, an armed attack originates in the state to which
the act is attributable irrespective of the actual location from which it is
executed and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the air-
craft.79
Commentators have lamented the brevity of the Advisory Opinion's
section on self-defense, particularly the absence of any consideration of
more recent state practice (U.S. actions in Sudan in 1998, for example)
and declining international disapproval of forcible action against terrorist
organizations abroad. 0 Whether for better or worse, the court chose to
render a brief statement on the matter, implicitly limiting the scope of
Article 51 to nonstate actor attacks which fulfill the accepted, and devel-
oping, requirements for attributing actions to a state. In light of the
74. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans), supra note 71,
35.
75. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Higgins), supra note 71, 33.
Regarding her reservations, see ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND How WE USE IT 250-51 (1994).
76. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J., supra note 71, 139.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Terrorist Threats by Secu-
rity Council President, U.N. Doc. SC/7167 (Oct. 8, 2001).
80. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, 1988).
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Advisory Opinion, Article 51 only comes into play in cases in which the
behavior of the perpetrators would be imputable to a state, whereas a
genuine nonstate actor threat presently does not qualify as an armed at-
tack triggering the right to self-defense. It follows that to the extent the
German LuftSiG condones the use of force against civil aircraft without
any distinction as to the perpetrators' status as a state or nonstate actor,
its article 14 is in violation of article 3bis of the Chicago Convention.
Furthermore, the LuftSiG envisions a practice in violation of recent ICJ
jurisprudence regarding Article 51 of the UN Charter.
C. The Domestic Perspective
The fact that article 3bis thus precludes the use of force against civil
aircraft in all cases in which the attack is not imputable to a state could
lead to a rather absurd conclusion vis-A-vis aircraft of a state's own reg-
istration. Article 3bis, on its face, precludes the use of force against a
state's own civil aircraft hijacked by its own nationals under all circum-
stances and without exception, given that the requirements of Article 51
could not possibly be fulfilled in such a genuinely domestic context.8'
While attention regarding the exceptions to article 3bis has centered
primarily on Article 51, it is noteworthy that the second sentence of arti-
cle 3bis subjects the stipulations of the article's first sentence to the
rights and obligations of the Charter as a whole.
The Charter, particularly the principle of sovereignty in Article 2(1),
preserves the right to domestic use of force subject merely to a state's
international human rights and humanitarian law obligations. It can thus
be argued that vis-A-vis aircraft of a state's own registration, the Charter
and article 3bis's second sentence grant wider discretion in the choice of
countermeasures, including forcible measures, so long as they are not
barred by national laws or international human rights law. Only then can
scenarios such as the Frankfurt Incident or the recent intrusion of a U.S.
civil aircraft into Washington airspace be dealt with outside the purview
of article 3bis and, in this regard, the rather incongruous Charter system
relating to the use of force. In light of such a reading, the extension of
the provisions' scope to aircraft of a state's own registration would be
meaningless. Still, this may have to be accepted given article 3bis's
81. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. T 139, supra note 71; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS-A COMMENTARY (BRUNO SIMMA et al. eds., 1994), supra note 65, at 116, 129.
82. On January 5, 2003 the pilot of a motor glider circled over the city of Frankfurt and
threatened to crash his plane into a skyscraper. See Frankfurter Rundschau, Jan. 5, 2003,
at http://www.fr-aktuell.de/uebersicht/alledossiers/politik-ausland/derterror und-die-folgen/
dermotorseglerueber.frankfurt/ (last visited May 10, 2005).
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original purpose of reconfirming the Charter system and the historic in-
terstate context in light of which it was adopted.
Viewed against the paradigm of the UN Charter system, the scope of
article 3bis appears to be overly broad inasmuch as it restrains a state
from acting in an exclusively domestic context. There is thus good rea-
son to argue that this editorial mistake-after all, nothing in the travaux
preparatoire indicates that the scope has been extended to national air-
craft intentionally-should be remedied by way of a teleological
reduction that a priori limits the scope of article 3bis's first sentence to
civil aircraft registered in other states. The use of force against civil air-
craft of a state's own registration, consequently, will be judged merely in
light of that state's national laws, international human rights, and hu-
manitarian law obligations.
D. Article 89 of the Chicago Convention
Article 89 of the Chicago Convention provides that "in case of war,"
the provisions of the Chicago Convention do not "affect the freedom of
action of any of the contracting states affected, whether as belligerents or
neutrals." The second sentence of article 89 stipulates that "the same
principle shall apply in the case of any contracting state which declares a
state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council."
In light of the aim of the Chicago Convention to regulate trans-
border civil aviation, there is good reason to argue that the term "war" in
its article 89 refers to international armed conflict. The threat of civil
airliners being converted into air-to-ground weapons, however, is one
stemming from private actors. Under the hypothesis that such behavior,
unlike the September 11 attacks, is not imputable to a state, such action
could merely be considered to fall within the purview of non-
international armed conflict. Irrespective of whether non-international
armed conflict qualifies as a "war" within the meaning of article 89 of
the Chicago Convention, it could still be argued that the respective pro-
visions of international humanitarian law regarding non-international
armed conflict, as a lex specialis in times of armed conflict, derogate
from the provisions of the Convention.
Regardless, the humanitarian law rules relating to civil aircraft in
Additional Protocol I and the San Remo Manual do apply in interna-
tional armed conflict. Determining the applicability of these rules in
times of non-international armed conflict as a matter of customary law
demands analysis of whether the scenario under discussion meets the
threshold of non-international armed conflict. This seems rather doubt-
ful, however, in light of the established criteria regarding the intensity
and duration required to constitute a non-international conflict. Yet the
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mere threat of a single attack might meet the threshold for a non-
international armed conflict under a genuine effects perspective, which
could overcome the required degree of "protracted violence."
Similarly, even though using an aircraft as a means for an armed at-
tack, thus endangering the lives of thousands of people, would in
substance qualify as an emergency situation within the meaning of arti-
cle 4 of the ICCPR, article 15 of the ECHR, and article 89 of the
Chicago Convention, this would only be of relevance if one accepts a de
facto state of emergency not requiring a formal declaration as foreseen in
these articles. More importantly, however, and irrespective of these intri-
cacies relating to the prerequisites of article 89 of the Chicago
Convention, there is good reason to argue that the prohibition on the use
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight enshrined in article 3bis of the
Chicago Convention is absolute.
Throughout the negotiations leading to article 3bis's promulgation,
the majority of delegations entertained the opinion that the article was
merely declaratory of previously existing customary law, that it only re-
flected a specific aspect of the general prohibition of the use of force,
and that it was needed solely to clarify remaining uncertainties.83 A few
delegations, however, were of the view that article 3bis added substan-
tially new rules. The former reading derives support from the ultimately
adopted declaratory phraseology of article 3bis: "The contracting State
recognizes that ... .,," On the other hand, the Austro-French proposal on
which article 3bis is largely based clearly stated: "At present time, there
83. For examples of unreserved recognition of the peremptory character of the prohibi-
tion of interstate force as expressed by the Charter, see Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th Session, reprinted in [1966] 2 YB. Int'l
L. Comm'n 247, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1/1966. See also The Secretary-General, Further
Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598,
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/23273 (Dec. 9, 1991) (explaining that Iraq's aggression against Iran was
a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus
cogens); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, comment k (1985); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 697-715 (6th ed. 2003); S.C. Res. 1067,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3683 mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1067 (1996)(describing the use of
force against civil aircraft as being "incompatible with elementary considerations of human-
ity"). With regard to the declaratory character of article 3bis, see ICAO, Report, Minutes and
Documents, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 36; Michael Milde, Interception of Civil Aircraft vs. Mis-
use of Civil Aviation, II ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 105, 125 (1986); Gilbert Guillaume, La
Destruction, le ler September 1983 de l'Avion des Korean Airlines, (vol. KE 007), 37-38
REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT AtRIEN 215, 225 (1984). See also Memorial submitted by the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran v. U.S.), 1990 I.C.J. Pleadings 141 (Jul. 24) (case concerning
the Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988). Even before article 3bis was adopted, ICAO had con-
demned the use of force against civil aircraft as a fundamental violation of the Chicago
Convention and international law in its Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Attack on Lib-
yan Civil Aircraft, 12 I.L.M 1180 (June 4, 1973). See also John T. Phelps II, Aerial Intrusions
by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255, 288-90 (1985).
84. Cheng, supra note 17, at 59.
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is no specific provision in modem international law which unambigu-
ously prohibits the use of armed force against civil aircraft.' 85 The
wording of the actual draft article in the Austro-French text mirrors this
understanding, commencing with the words, "Each contracting State
undertakes," thus implying the assumption of new obligations.
Still, even if customary law at the time was ambiguous as to whether
armed force could be employed against civil aircraft, states adopted arti-
cle 3bis precisely with the aim to clarify the legal situation and to close
potential loopholes. Security concerns some delegations voiced through-
out the drafting process did not prevail, and ultimately the parties
codified a rather strict prohibition of the use of force against civil air-
craft. Subsequently, in response to a Cuban aerial incident, the Security
Council in Resolution 1067 of July 26, 1996, condemned "the use of
weapons against civil aircraft as being incompatible with elementary
considerations of humanity [and] the rules of customary international
law as codified in article 3bis of the Chicago Convention." Thus, without
prejudice to the status of the existing law prior to the adoption of article
3bis, there is now little ground to argue against an all encompassing pro-
hibition on the use of force against civil aircraft, subject to the exception
of self-defense but otherwise absolute. Again, this conclusion finds sup-
port in the fact that it is precisely in emergency situations that a state
might consider resorting to forcible and potentially deadly countermea-
sures, and it is the very gist of article 3bis of the Chicago Convention to
rule out the use of force in these situations if they do not amount to an
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51.
In addition, unlike article 3bis, which states subsequently introduced
into the Chicago Convention by way of amendment, article 89 belongs to
the set of original articles of the Convention. The rationale of article 89
was to grant states their freedom of action in times of war or emergency
vis-A-vis restrictions stemming from the initial provisions of the Chicago
Convention. In contrast, the negotiations leading to the adoption of arti-
cle 3bis clearly evidence that states did not intend to subject this
provision to any form of derogation other than those exceptions provided
for by its own terms. Thus, irrespective of article 89 of the Chicago Con-
vention, the legitimacy of forcible countermeasures against civil aircraft
in flight must be determined solely within the purview of article 3bis of
the Convention and Article 51 of the Charter.
85. The proposal is reproduced in ICAO Report, Minutes and Documents, supra note 4,
at 167. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L.
336, 341 (1989); Sompong Sucharitkul, Procedure for the Protection of Civil Aircraft in
Flight, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 513, 519-20 (1994).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Even though airport security has increased considerably so as to pre-
vent the recurrence of events akin to the attacks of September 11, it is
beyond doubt that preventive measures alone cannot provide absolute
security against this persistent threat. 6 In addition, opportunities for in-
terference are growing, as the process of globalization requires constant
enhancement of cross-border transport, especially through aviation tech-
nology, to meet the ever-increasing desire to further overcome space and
time as natural barriers to global interrelations. Soon the giant A-380
Airbus will open up yet another dimension of long distance air travel.
Undoubtedly, this new technology, combined with events like the Sep-
tember 11 attacks and the Frankfurt incident of January 5, 2003, have
only compounded the perception of a real and considerable threat.
Nevertheless, article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, read in con-
junction with ICJ jurisprudence, precludes the use of force against civil
aircraft in cases in which nonstate actors threaten to employ aircraft as
destructive weapons against ground targets. With regard to threats to air-
craft stemming from nonstate actors, existing law thus marks the upper
limit of interference. Moreover, article 3bis of the Chicago Convention
acuminates the contemporary debate surrounding the scope of Article 51
of the Charter vis-A-vis attacks by nonstate actors and the underlying
question of how to meet the legitimate security demands of states. It pro-
ceeds that article 3bis excludes resort to any other grounds precluding
wrongfulness, including a state of necessity, Judge Simma's concept of
full-scale armed attacks, and other hostile actions that fall outside the
scope of Article 51 yet nevertheless justify proportionate defensive
measures on the part of the victim.
87
Some have described article 3bis as intrinsically flawed, in that it
subjects what in essence is a question of the treatment of aliens to the
86. See, e.g., ICAO, Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction
and Other Terrorist Acts Involving Civil Aviation, supra note 7, 7 (directing the Council and
the Secretary General to act urgently to address the new and emerging threats to civil aviation)
(emphasis added).
87. In his separate opinion in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Judge Simma stated:
[T]here are two levels to be distinguished: there is, first, the level of 'armed attacks'
in the substantial, massive sense of amounting to 'une agression armde,' to quote
the French authentic text of Article 51 .... But we may encounter also a lower
level of hostile military action, not reaching the threshold of an 'armed attack'
within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Against such hos-
tile acts, a State may of course defend itself, but only within a more limited range
and quality of responses ....
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States of America), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1433,
1 12-13 (Nov. 6, 2003) (separate opinion of Judge Sinuna).
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purview of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, which were never
intended to lay down specific rules on how states, especially within their
own territory, should or should not treat either their own or foreign na-
tionals.88 Indeed, article 3bis fosters such criticism because it subjects
measures of interception to rather strict human rights standards, includ-
ing the obligation not to endanger the lives of persons on board aircraft, 9
whereas the Charter system allows more forcible measures.
On the assumption that the prohibition on the threat or use of force is
limited to the international relations between states, various authors have
opined that it does not encompass protective military acts within state
territory against intruding persons or aircraft.9° This reading is in line
with the fact that article 1 of the Chicago Convention accords a state
"complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its terri-
tory." Article 3bis, in its ambiguity, has not entirely ruled out a
renaissance of such an argument, since its provisions are subject to the
rights and obligations of the UN Charter in its entirety, which include the
principle of sovereignty. Of course, any invocation of the principle of
sovereignty with the intention to argue for a greater scope of discretion
within a state's territorial airspace would render article 3bis altogether
meaningless. Further, it would be in stark contradiction to the clear in-
tentions of the drafting fathers; the remedial instrument of teleological
reduction is feasible only vis- -vis civil aircraft of a state's own registra-
tion.
Law is a product of social reality, and this reality is subject to
change. Undoubtedly, international security concerns have shifted since
the adoption of article 3bis in 1984 from state-to-state confrontations
toward more asymmetrical threats posed by nonstate actors. Thus, the
question of how to adequately respond to palpable threats from such ac-
tors, who in the course of their criminal undertakings employ means and
methods with the destructive potential of military attacks, seems ever
88. See Plenary Meetings, Resolutions and Minutes, A25-Res, P-Min, ICAO Doc. 9437,
at 60-62 (Apr. 24-May 10, 1984); see also ICAO, Report, Minutes and Documents, supra
note 4, at 22, 92.
89. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last accessed
Sept. 22, 2005)( stipulating that the right to life "shall be protected by law" and that "no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life").
90. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1958); Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1626 (1984); THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994), supra
note 65, 34. See also the definition of aggression in G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., 2319th plen. mtg at art.3(d) (Dec. 14, 1974). Article 3(d) considers an "attack by the
armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State"
as armed force and prima facie evidence of an act of aggression in the sense of article 2 of the
same resolution. Id.
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more pressing. Irrespective of whether states perceive their discretion to
respond to newly emerging threats as unacceptably restrained by the ap-
plicable legal framework, they are bound to respect such laws for the
time being. Genuine security interests of states are at stake, but counter-
ing such threats through an all too monocentric approach that disregards
accepted rules of international law may adversely affect international
peace rather than foster it. Article 3bis, in light of all its flaws and ambi-
guities, is evidence of an overhasty response to a once imminently
perceived threat. Lest the same mistake be repeated in the realm of civil
aviation security, a profound discussion and reconsideration of existing
laws is preferable to tacit ignorance of accepted legal standards justified
by a perceived divergence of social reality and legal restrictions. Ulti-
mately, heeding the rule of law will prove to be the optimum and
potentially exclusive strategy for effectively countering international ter-
rorism.
